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Abstract
As the first step to defend against DoS attacks, Network-based Intrusion Detection
System is well explored and widely used in both commercial tools and research works. Such
IDS framework is built upon features extracted from the network traffic, which are
application-level features, and is effective in detecting flooding-based DoS attacks. However,
in a sophisticated DoS attack, where an attacker manages to bypass the network-based
monitors and launch a DoS attack locally, sniffer-based methods have difficulty in
differentiating attacks with normal behaviors, since the malicious connection itself behaves in
the same manner of normal connections. In this work, we study a Host-based IDS framework
which integrates features from architectural and operating system (OS) levels to improve
performance of sophisticated DoS intrusion detection. Network traffic collected from a
campus network, and real-world exploits are used to provide a realistic evaluation.

vii

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Overview

Denials of Service (DoS) attacks impose serious threat on the availability and quality of
Internet services [15]. They exhaust limited resources such as network bandwidth, DRAM
space, CPU cycles, or specific protocol data structures, inducing service degradation or
outage in computing infrastructures for the clients. System downtime resulting from DoS
attacks could lead to million dollars’ loss.
Generally, DoS attacks can be either flooding-based or software exploit-based. In a
flooding-based DoS attack, a malicious user sends out a tremendously large number of
packets aiming at overwhelming a victim host. For example, in a SYN-flooding attack, a
significant number of TCP SYN packets are sent towards a victim machine, saturating
resources in the victim machine. We can observe a surge of TCP connections in a short time,
which are modeled by a tuple of application features <source IP, destination IP, source port,
destination port>. In exploit-based DoS attacks, specially crafted packets are sent to the
victim system targeting at specific software vulnerabilities in the operating system, service or
application. The success of exploitation will either overwhelm or crash the target system.
An existing solution to the exploit-based attacks is to patch and update software frequently.
Currently, research work on DoS intrusion detections mainly rely on Network-based
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) [3][5][6][7][8][10][21]. The NIDSs monitor features
extracted from network packet headers at the application layer such as packet rate and traffic
volume. Ramp-up behaviors and frequency domain characteristics are also studied to aid in
1

improving the accuracy and performance of IDS [3][6]. On the other hand, Host-based
Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs) which widely employ audit trails and system call
tracking can effectively identify buffer overflow (BoF) attacks [1][2][19]. However, the DoS
attacks are not easily observed by such an HIDS and not widely researched in the HIDS
literature. Some researchers have proposed to limit the bound of certain system calls [1] such
as fork(). However, with the advent of large-scale application software, such bounds may
seriously impair the performance of normal applications. Moreover, DoS attacks may not
involve huge number of system calls at all. Therefore, a more generic solution is needed to
detect DoS attacks.
When increasingly sophisticated techniques are adopted by attackers, multi-tier attacks
and IP spoofing are emerging to amplify destructive effects and evade detections. The attack
patterns or behaviors will be difficult to identify by using only header-based network traffic
analysis. For example, in a complicated scenario that an attacker gets around the network
monitoring sensors and launches DoS attacks locally, a NIDS may not be able to detect this
intrusion. In such a scenario, non-privileged access is good enough to successfully initiate a
DoS attack against the host machine: once the attacker obtains the access to the victim
machine, even if it is not root-privileged and difficult to further elevate to carry out other
destructive or stealthy behaviors, he/she can still easily upload a DoS daemon to massively
consume the machine’s limited resources. Instead of network information only, information
originated and resided on the victim machine should be used to track and monitor such
undergoing attacks in this case.

2

1.2

Major Contributions

In this work, we propose an HIDS with multi-level integrated information from
application, operating system (OS), and architecture levels to improve the detection rate of
sophisticated DoS attacks. Figure 1-1 illustrates the framework of our proposed IDS
framework. At different levels, we use different tools or schemes to collect and extract typical
features of possible intrusions. According to our experiments, even if DoS attacks could
successfully evade captures of NIDS monitors, architectural behaviors will still be triggered:
tremendous jumps of Instruction Count, Cache Miss, Bus Traffic can be found. Based on this
observation, a novel HIDS employing a modern statistical Gradient Boosting Trees (GBT)
model is proposed to detect sophisticated DoS intrusions through the integration of
application, OS, and architectural features. Our experiments show that the inclusion of
architectural features can significantly improve the detection rate of such evasive DoS
intrusions

Figure 1-1.

Framework of multi-level IDS

3

1.3

Thesis Outline

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: background knowledge is introduced in
chapter 2. Our proposed IDS methodology and framework is elaborated in chapter 3. Chapter
4 provides the technical details of the multi-level IDS implementation. Dataset generation is
described in chapter 5. The experiment results are shown and discussed in chapter 6. Related
work is discussed in chapter 7. We conclude the work in chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Background and Basic Concepts

2.1

Types of Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion Detection Systems can be broadly divided into two categories: Host-based and
Network-based Intrusion Detection System. Other types of IDSs could be considered variants
or hybrid of these two basic types.

2.1.1

Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)

HIDS monitors and analyses the internal behavior of a computing system, including all
or part of the dynamic behavior and the state of a computer system. Event logs, audit trails,
system call tracking are widely utilized to identify and defend against attacks.

Figure 2-1.

HIDS Topology
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The topology of HIDS is shown in Figure 2-1. Machines labeled in blue are installed
with the HIDS. Since the IDS is host-based, actual installation on the system under monitor is
required. Otherwise, the IDS can not gain full access to the internal system information.

2.1.2

Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)

As opposed to monitoring the activities that originates on a particular system, NIDS
focus on external information outside monitored target. It sniffers network traffic and analyze
all in-coming packets, looking for suspicious patterns of malicious connections.

Figure 2-2.

NIDS Topology

As shown in Figure 2-2, the NIDS highlighted in blue is usually placed behind the LAN
firewall. It can be implemented as software, or appliance hardware. It keeps monitoring the
traffic coming from outside network and within the LAN, and it also analyzes the content of
6

individual packets in search for malicious traffic. To monitor a LAN, only one such device is
required to install. Comparing to HIDS, NIDS adopts a centralized infrastructure in the LAN.

2.2

IDS Methodologies

Signature and anomaly detection are two primary IDS approaches. They have their own
advantages and disadvantages, and actually, they complement each other in the intrusion
detection field.

2.2.1

Signature-based IDS

Signature-based IDS employs specifically known patterns of misuse behavior to predict
potential malicious activities. These patterns, i.e. signatures, could be the number of failed
log-ins during a certain time frame, or specific patterns matching a portion of network
packets.
PROS: Signatures are easy to develop and understand if you know what malicious
behavior you're trying to identify.
CONS: Virus database must be constantly updated. A signature must be created for every
attack, and novel attacks cannot be detected.

2.2.2

Anomaly-based IDS

Anomaly-based IDS is designed to uncover misuse behavioral patterns by examining
network traffic and system activities. They establish a baseline of normal behavior, observe
when current behavior deviates statistically from the norm, and flag those activities as
possible intrusions.
PROS: Anomaly-based IDS has the ability to promptly detect novel attacks that are

7

unknown or for which signatures are not developed yet.
CONS: As normal behavior can change easily and readily, there is no standard normal
behavior profile. Anomaly-based IDS systems are prone to substantial false positives where
attacks may be reported based on deviations from the norm patterns.

8

Chapter 3
Multi-Level Intrusion Detection System

3.1

Methodology

In our design, we integrate the information which only resides on the host machine under
attacks, and then construct a multi-layer IDS to detect sophisticated DoS attacks. The
correlation of system architectural behaviors and DoS attacks is analyzed by a modern
statistical model employing Gradient Boosting Trees techniques. Architectural features are
explored to improve the IDS performance. Our proposed scheme involves multiple steps
listed as follows.
z

Step 1: Data Collection
We use the tcpdump utility to record header information of network packets

transmitting towards/from the host computer. Architectural behaviors are recorded using
a device driver which periodically samples the CPU performance counters and dumps
out the performance variation trace. System call tracking function embedded in the Linux
kernel is utilized to record OS level events.
z

Step 2: Feature Extraction and Correlation
Our desired application level features are extracted using a custom network traffic

parser which models records by network sessions identified by src_ip:src_port <->
dst_ip:dst_port. OS level features are extracted from a system call tracking function
embedded in the kernel. Architectural records are processed as a ratio of event numbers
during the current session to a pre-measured normal session without attacks.

9

Figure 3-1.

The framework of our IDS

Since features of different levels are obtained by different collecting processes, we
append a timestamp to each record for the correlation between architectural events and
application events during the same session.
z

Step 3: Intrusion Prediction
As a standard workflow, in this step, each correlated record is fed to the statistical

model which has learned the patterns of normal and attack behaviors from the training
dataset. It will raise an alert if the given record deviates from normal behaviors.

3.2

IDS Framework

The framework of our proposed intrusion detection system consists of a learning module
and an inference module as shown in Figure 3-1. The learning module is used to build up the
knowledge from an offline training dataset. The knowledge base contains a statistical model
which is learned from observed traffic, and has the ability to predict whether a network
connection is malicious or benign. The inference module is the analysis engine of our IDS. Its
task is to process the data collected from the sensors in order to identify intrusive activities.
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The training set and the real-time traffic include features from different levels as shown
in Table 3-1, Table 3-2 and Table 3-3.
1. Application (APP) Feature Set
Table 3-1.
Feature Name
protocol_type
service
duration
size_from_client
size_from_server
packet_rate
wrong_
checksum_rate

Application Level Features

Description
Type of the protocol, e.g., tcp, udp, etc.
Network service on the destination system, e.g., ssh,
http, telnet, etc.
Length of the connection
Number of data bytes from client to server
Number of data bytes from server to client
Number of two-way packets per second
Percent of packets have wrong checksum

Type
discrete
discrete
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous

2. Architectural (ARCH) Feature Set
Table 3-2.
Feature Name
instruction_
retired
L1_cache_miss
L2_cache_miss
bus_access

Architectural Level Features

Description
Ratio of average instructions committed during a
session to a pre-measured normal session
Ratio of average L1 cache miss during a session to a
pre-measured normal session
Ratio of average L2 cache miss during a session to a
pre-measured normal session
Ratio of average bus transactions during a session to a
pre-measured normal session

Type
continuous
continuous
continuous
continuous

We select these features because a typical network DoS attack can be monitored by
observing these events [22]. These events exhibit very obvious variations during DoS attacks.
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3. Operating System (OS) Feature Set
Table 3-3.
Feature Name
forked_socket_session
forked_shell
forked_from_shell
coincided_pid

3.3

OS Level Features

Description
Forked another network connection
Forked shell sessions
Forked from another network connection
Shares a same pid as another different
network connection

Type
discrete
discrete
discrete
discrete

Statistical Model

The statistical model that we employed for intrusion detection is based on Gradient
Boosting Trees (GBT), originally proposed in [4]. GBT is one of several techniques that aim
to improve the performance of a single model by fitting many models and combining them
for prediction. GBT uses two algorithms: “trees” from the Classification and Regression Tree
and “boosting” which builds and combines a collection of models, i.e. trees.
From a user’s point of view, GBT has three major advantages. First, GBT is inherently
non-parametric and able to handle mixed-type of input variables. Both discrete and
continuous data are supported. There is no need of data discretization. GBT does not need to
make any assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of the values for the input
variables. Thus, it relieves researchers from determining whether variables are normally
distributed, and making transformations if they are not. Second, the tree is adept at capturing
complex-structured behavior, i.e. complex interactions among predictors are routinely and
automatically handled with relatively few inputs required from the analyst. This is in marked
contrast to some other multivariate nonlinear modeling methods, in which extensive input
from the analyst, analysis of interim results, and subsequent modification of the method are
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required. Third, the tree is insensitive to outliers, and unaffected by monotone
transformations and differing scales of measurement among inputs. Despite clear evidence of
strong predictive performance, boosting-based learning methods have been rarely used in
computer intrusion detection [24].
Consider the binary classification problem with n observations of the form {yi, xi},
i=1,…,n, where xi is a multi-dimensional input vector and yi is the binary response yi ∈ {-1,+1}.
In this paper, xi is the feature in multiple levels and yi is the prediction result, i.e., attack or
benign connection. The negative log-likelihood for the binomial model or deviance (also
known as cross-entropy) is used as the loss function:

( )

(

(

L y, fˆ = log 1 + exp − 2 yfˆ

))

The population minimizer of the loss function is at the true probabilities:

1 ⎡ Pr( y = 1 | x) ⎤
arg min EY|x [L( y, f (x))] = f * (x) = log⎢
f (x)
2 ⎣ Pr( y = −1 | x) ⎥⎦
Or equivalently:

Pr ( y = 1 | x ) =

1
1 + e −2 f

*

(x )

where EY |x [L( y, f (x ))] is the expectation value of the loss function over Y given the input X.

The detailed algorithm for GBT in binary classification is the following.
1)

Initialize fˆ0 (x i ) = 1 log ⎛⎜⎜ 1 + y ⎞⎟⎟ , where y is the average for {yi }.
2
⎝1− y ⎠

2)

Repeat for m = 1, 2, …, M:
a) Set the negative gradient:

(

)

⎡ ∂L yi , fˆm−1 (xi ) ⎤
~
yim = − ⎢
⎥, i = 1,..., n.
ˆ
⎣ ∂f m−1 (x i ) ⎦
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b)

{Rhm }hH=1 = H-terminal node tree based on {~y im , x i }in=1

c)

γ hm = arg min

d)
3)

γ

∑ L(y , fˆ (x ) + γ )

xi∈Rhm

i

i

fˆm (x ) = fˆm−1 (x ) + ν × γ hm I (x ∈ Rhm )

End algorithm.

Note that ν is the “shrinkage” parameter between 0 and 1 and controls the learning rate
of the procedure. Empirical results have shown that small values of ν always lead to better
generalization error rates [4]. In this study, we fix ν at 0.01. During each iteration, an
H-terminal node tree, which partitions the x space into H-disjoint regions,
fitted based on the current negative gradient for the loss function.

14

{Rhm }hH=1 , is

Chapter 4
Implementation of Multi-Level IDS

4.1

Overview

We summarize network traffic captured in a tcpdump file into high-level connections.
Specifically, a connection is a sequence of network packets starting and ending at some well
defined points in time, between which data flows under a well defined protocol from a source
IP address to a target IP address. Before processing the data with the IDS training algorithm,
raw network traffic has to be pre-processed and summarized into connections or high-level
events. Each connection is described with a set of features which IDS models can utilize to
detect possible intrusions.

4.2

Application Level Parser

Our modified parser based on an open source utility Chaosreader extracts desired
information in the application level out from the recorded tcpdump files, and groups packets
into sessions by src_ip:src_port <-> dst_ip:dst_port, thus we will obtain a set of preprocessed
data in the format that each entry represents a network connection, together with application
features flagged accordingly.
Our desired information is stored in different header levels, thus the parser strips the
headers level by level, and construct the features we need.
The workflow of the parser is shown in Figure 4-2.

15

Figure 4-1.

Figure 4-2.

Network packet header

Workflow of application level parser
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4.3

OS Level System Call Tracking

At operation system level, we employ a system call tracking function based on
BackTracker [9] to record all system call driven events, and related network socket sessions.
We append a timestamp to every record; add full IP address and port number information to
all socket sessions, in order to correlate OS events with other level events. BackTracker
discovers sequences of steps that occurred during an intrusion. Starting at a single detection
point (e.g., a suspicious file), it identifies files and processes that could have affected that
detection point and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. BackTracker is able to
record every dependency-causing event among OS objects, and span up a dependency chain
starting from one object. Complete information such as process forking, file operations, and
program execution (which is important for security analysis), is recorded in a system-call
oriented manner.

4.4

Architectural Level Kernel Module

The Intel Pentium-D processor provides us with adequate performance counters to
illustrate the CPU’s dynamic performance profile. A kernel module is implemented to sample
the performance counters in regular intervals. We set the sampling interval to 0.5s, balancing
the tradeoff between system performance overhead and accuracy of monitored performance
variation. Thus, at regular interval, the values of these four architectural counters which have
most representative architectural variation under a DoS attack are recorded and dumped to a
trace file. The timestamp recorded together with other performance counters is used to
correlate architectural events with network connections parsed from tcpdump files.
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4.4.1

Performance Monitoring Counters

Performance monitoring is introduced in Pentium processor. A set of performance
monitoring registers are provided to monitor or measure processor performance profile. The
performance monitoring mechanism varies with processor families. The target system used in
the experiment is installed with Pentium-D processor, which features Intel NetBurst
Microarchitecture. 18 Performance Counter MSRs (PC MSR) are provided to count events.
Each PC MSR is associated with one Counter Configuration Control Register (CCCR) to set
up a specific counting method. Every PC MSR and CCCR pair is controlled by a subset of 45
Event Selection Control Registers (ESCR). Table 4-1 lists the registers we need to use to
sample CPU performance events. All registers are read/written using RDMSR, WRMSR, or
RDPMC instruction.

Table 4-1.
Register

List of registers used to monitor CPU performance
Name

Function

MSR

Model Specific Register

PC MSR

Performance Counter MSR

ESCR

Event Selection Control Register

CCCR

Counter
Register

Configuration

Monitor performance, debug system,
enable/disable model specific functions,
etc.
Store actual event number

Select events to be monitored by
specific PC MSR

Control Set up the associated performance
counter to function in a specific style

18

Table 4-2. PC MSR and control registers used to sample
desired architectural events
Event to Monitor

Register Address

Register Name

Inst_Retired

0x3b8
0x36c
0x30c
0x3cc
0x370
0x310
0x3a1
0x362
0x302
0x3a2
0x360
0x300

MSR_CRU_ESCR0
MSR_IQ_CCCR0
MSR_IQ_COUNTER0
MSR_CRU_ESCR2
MSR_IQ_CCCR4
MSR_IQ_COUNTER4
MSR_BSU_ESCR1
MSR_BPU_CCCR2
MSR_BPU_COUNTER2
MSR_FSB_ESCR0
MSR_BPU_CCCR0
MSR_BPU_COUNTER0

L1_Cache_Miss

L2_Cache_Miss

Bus_Access

A specific procedure needs to be followed to correctly configure the control registers and
enable performance counters to count on the correct events:
Step 1: Identify events to monitor.
Step 2: For each selected event, choose an ESCR which support the event.
Step 3: Identify the CCCRs and PC MSRs associated with the ESCRs.
Step 4: Set up ESCR with correct event mask and privilege level.
Step 5: Set up CCCR with correct ESCR mask. (Cascading and event filtering are
optional)
Step 6: Set CCCR enable flag to start event counting.
Step 7: Sample PC MSRs to poll out CPU performance profile.
For those four architectural events we need to monitor, PC MSR and control registers
listed in Table 4-2 need to be configured or sampled.
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4.4.2

Implementation of Kernel Module

Although RDPMC instruction is allowed to execute in all privilege levels, control
registers have to be configured with WRMSR instruction, which can only be executed at
privilege level 0. Thus, a kernel module, i.e. device driver, is implemented to manipulate on
hardware registers, and obtain the information of system runtime performance variations.
Linux kernel allows kernel modules to be loaded and unloaded at run time, without rebooting
the system. It runs at privilege level 0 and has full access to all system devices.
A virtual file under /proc directory is also created to dump out information from kernel
space to user space. /proc is a virtual file system that contains a hierarchy of dynamic virtual
files. Those files represent current status of the kernel. They allow users and applications to
gain insight of system’s kernel status, and communicate configuration changes to the kernel.
The implemented module creates two directories under /proc; they serve as an interface
between kernel space and user space:
/proc/perf_mon/setting:

Used to configure counter sampling

/proc/perf_mon/event:

Used for user-mode application to poll out counter values.

The /proc/perf_mon/setting entry supports four types of command:
Start:

Initiate all ESCRs and CCCRs, place sampling routine on wait queue to
periodically sample PC MSRs at predefined intervals.

Clear:

Set all control registers to zero, clear PC MSRs.

Stop:

Set all ESCRs and CCCRs to zero, stop event counting, but values in PC
MSRs are still preserved.

Read:

Increment internal read number counter.
20

Once sampling routine is initiated, it will keep writing event numbers to the
/proc/perf_mon/event entry buffer. Since memory space for a /proc entry is limited, we
implemented a user mode application to flush all event numbers from /proc/perf_mon/event
entry at pre-calculated intervals. And the event entry will be refreshed after all contents are
dumped out.
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Chapter 5
Datasets Generation

5.1

System Environment

We use an Intel Pentium-D PC installed with Redhat Linux 9.0 as target system, and
another machine installed with Suse 10 as attacker/client system. Both machines are
connected to a department LAN. Exploits are launched from attacker to target system.
Network traffic information is captured with the tcpdump tool.

5.2

Developed Denial-of-Service Exploits

Nowadays more sophisticated techniques are emerging to escape IDS detections; in this
work, we assume crackers have gained unauthorized access to the victim machine (they may
only have non-privileged access), and then intend to launch local DoS daemons. To emulate
this scenario, we design five local DoS exploits which are used to model local DoS exploits
exhausting different system resources. Each exploit target a specific type of system resources,
intentionally exhausting a particular resource, and rendering the system unavailable to
legitimate users. Table 5-1 outlines the detailed descriptions of these exploits. First three
attacks are traversing a certain memory space with the stride of the cache line size (64 bytes
in our system). In this case, regardless of set associativity of data cache, constant cache miss
will be generated upon each memory access.
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Figure 5-1.

Pseudo code snipet for BSB DoS exploits

Table 5-1.
Attack Type
L2 Cache DoS
BSB DoS
FSB DoS
Memory DoS
Loop DoS

The self-developed DoS exploits

Description
Target L2 cache, sweep through L2 cache space
Target backside bus bandwidth, sweep through twice the L1 D$ size,
saturate backside bus
Target front-side bus bandwidth, sweep through twice L2 cache size,
saturate front-side bus.
Target memory space; keep allocating memory space, max out
memory usage.
Target CPU usage, infinite dummy instruction.

Table 5-2.
Dataset
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3
Training 4
Training 5
Testing

Dataset construction
Combination
l2 + bsb + fsb + mem
l2 + bsb + fsb + loop
l2 + bsb + mem + loop
l2 + fsb + mem + loop
bsb + fsb + mem + loop
l2 + bsb + fsb + mem + loop + noise
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We launch these exploits multiple times over a LAN to obtain five different training
datasets, each containing only four exploit types. Details of the training and testing sets
construction are listed in Table 5-2.
The testing dataset includes a full set of the above five exploit types, 25 attack instances
in total, and is injected with noise traffic data of CPU or memory intensive operations such as
tar, compile, scp etc. Those noises are included in order to evaluate the ability of the IDS to
differentiate normal operation and attack traffic. In addition, we also include 3630 normal
connections.

5.3

Real-world Exploits

Apart from our crafted exploits, we also evaluate our proposed scheme using mixed data
with real-world remote DoS exploits, and dataset of real-world local DoS exploits. The
descriptions of real-world remote DoS exploits in the experiment are outlined in Table 5-3,
and description of those local DoS exploits are listed in Table 5-4.
We divide the mixed data of hand-crafted exploits and real-world remote DoS expoits
into five training datasets and one testing dataset. Training data contains partial set of all
exploits, while the testing data contains a full set of all exploit types. Testing data also
include significant amount of noise traffic, which is injected intending to evaluate the ability
of the IDS to detect exploits never seen before and avoid the false alarms.
The real-world local DoS exploits will be used separately to evaluate the ability of our
proposed IDS to identify novel local DoS attacks it has not seen before.
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Table 5-3.
Attack
CVE-2003-0132
CVE-2003-0543
CVE-2004-0493
CVE-2004-0942

Real-world remote DoS exploits

Description
Apache memory leak, drains memory via large
chunks of linefeed characters.
OpenSSL integer overflow, causes Apache server to
enter CPU intensive loop.
Apache memory exhaustion.
Apache multiple space header DoS, drains CPU
resource.

Table 5-4.
Attack
Memory leak local DoS - 1
Memory leak local DoS - 2

Real-world local DoS exploits
Description
Kernel vulnerability causing exhaustion of
system memory resource, inducing system crash.
Kernel vulnerability allows non-privileged users
to read kernel memory and system performance
degradation.
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Chapter 6
Results and Analysis

6.1

Performance Metrics

We use the typical four measurments to evaluate performance of our IDS. True positive
(TP) rate is the ratio of the number of correctly detected attacks and the total number of
attacks. The true negative (TN) rate is the ratio of the number of normal connections and the
total number of normal connections. The false positive (FP) rate is the ratio of the number of
normal connections that are incorrectly classified as attacks and the total number of normal
connections. False negative (FN) is the rate of missed attacks.

Table 6-1.

Measurements of IDS System

Predicted Normal

6.2

Predicted Intrusions

Actual
Normal True Negative (TN)
Connection

False Positive (FP)

Actual Intrusions False Negative (FN)
(Attacks)

True Positive (TP)
(correctly
detected
intrusions)

IDS Performance Comparison

We conduct three sets of experiments, to evaluate the ability of different IDS schemes to
identify simulated and real-world DoS exploits.
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6.2.1 Evaluation with Developed Exploits
Two sets of experimental results are shown to demonstrate how architectural events help
to increate the true positive rate, and how OS events assist in decreasing false positives.

6.2.1.1

Two Level Feature Sets

Firstly, we train an IDS using the GBT model with only the application level features
listed in Chapter 3. Results shown in Figure. 6-1 reveal that IDS built on the application
features alone can only recognized around 30% of such DoS attacks (refer to the light bar
group in Figure 6-1). These testing results demonstrate that the APP features are not

APP

APP + ARCH

100%
90%
True Positive rate

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1

2

3
Training Set

4

5

Figure 6-1.

Detection rate of IDS with one level and two level feature sets

Table 6-2.

False alarm rate of IDS of one level and two level feature sets
Training
Set
1
2
3
4
5

False Positive Rate ( % )
APP
APP + ARCH
0
0.19
0
0.08
0
0.19
0
0.19
0
0.19
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Table 6-3. Sample records. The label is the actual attribute of the
connection, pred_1 is prediction from APP framework, pred_2
is the prediction result from APP+ARCH framework
Num

Service type duration size_server size_client pkt_r wrong_cks_r ic l1_m l2_m bus_acc label pred_1 pred_2

1

ssh

tcp

77.26

2

ssh

tcp 355.16

3

ssh

4

ssh

...

...

3993

2004

2.67

1.73 normal

normal

normal

0.77 0.05 55.75 3602.53

1.18

0.96 attack

normal

attack

tcp 219.15 11393 3540

1.62 0.03 264.11 0.81

0.84

0.87 attack

normal

attack

tcp 228.68 17121 3300

1.97 0.03 11.73 2.56

3.27

25.56

normal

attack

0407 2148

2.01

0.05

1.14

1.48

attack

sufficient to detect the DoS intrusions accurately. Over half of attack instances successfully
escape from application level monitor.
This result is expectable since we assume that our multi-step attacks can bypass the
application level feature monitors and launch DoS exploits locally. The network connection
behaves exactly the same as other normal connections. No typical properties such as traffic
bursts of the DoS attacks could be observed at the application level. Therefore, the IDS can
not differentiate them from other normal operations.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of architectural monitors, we conduct another
experiment with added architectural features. The results are illustrated in the gray bar group
of Figure 6-1. From the figure, we can see that the capability to detect novel multi-step DoS
attacks is greatly improved to an average of 91.2% by integrating
ARCH features. For training set 3, 4 and 5, we achieve a detection rate almost to 100%.
A few example records are shown in Table 6-3 to illustrate the different behaviors of
malicious and benign operations monitored from multi-level features. For the ARCH event
columns, we list the ratio of the numbers of the event during a session to a pre-measured
normal session. The first entry is a normal ssh connection that is commonly seen in a local
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network. The next three entries are BSB, loop, memory DoS attacks. Each of them has
manifest architectural variations (see the bolded italic numbers), but the application (APP)
level features stay in the same pattern as a normal connection. This explains why in a
sophisticated DoS attack scenario, intrusions can escape detection from APP level. The IDS
built with APP features only can not distinguish such attacks from other normal sessions.
Therefore, it lacks sufficient information to make a correct judgment.
However, ARCH features also bring in false positives compared to pure APP feature
framework as shown in Table 6-2. Even though the false positive rate is as low as an average
of 0.17%, considering the amount of normal connections is large, over 3000 records, the
actual number of false alerts is not negligible. The most challenging issue to integrate ARCH
features into IDS is how to reduce false positives, since at ARCH level, memory or CPU
intensive workloads, and malicious DoS attacks have similar characteristics which is difficult
to differentiate at the this level.

6.2.1.2

Three Level Feature Set

To reduce false positives brought in by ARCH events, we first analyze the way by which
crackers may log-in to the victim system. In practice, remote Buffer-Overflow (BoF) and
guessing password are mainly used to gain unauthorized access to the target machine. After
crackers gain illegal access to the victim system, a DoS attack may be launched. In this paper,
we assume that an illegal user will conduct a BoF attack first to obtain access to the target
system then start a DoS attack. In this scenario, we enforce the IDS with BoF detection
capability with OS level monitors and then write prediction results into the system event log.
We can distinguish between a normal heavy duty program and an illegal DoS attack in this
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way: we search the event log and check if a BoF exploit was found in this connection before.
If it was found and architectural events also show an abnormal pattern, we think that the
system is under DoS attack; otherwise, we believe that there is a legal heavy duty program
running on the target machine, i.e., the system is in a normal state.
We conducted experiments integrating OS level features into the IDS to detect remote
BoF attacks. The OS features we employed include: forked_socket_session, forked_shell,
forked_from_shell, coincided_pid. Those features are obtained using BackTracker’s [9]
system call tracking function embedded in the Linux kernel. Through an experiment, we
achieve an average True Positive rate of 90.3%, True Negative rate of 99.6%. Detailed
experiment procedure is elaborated in Appedix A.
With the highly accurate BoF detection rate, we apply the results into DoS detections in
the way described in the last paragraph to reduce false alarm rate induced by ARCH monitors.
As shown in the last column of Table 6-4, the false positive rate is almost reduced to zero in
all of the cases. The true positive rate is slightly affected as shown by the dark bar in Figure
6-2.

But its average, 90.81%, is still considered as good performance in detecting

sophisticated DoS attacks.
Note that we only take BoF for example here, just to demonstrate that additional
information could be utilized to reduce the false positives. Guessing password can also be
accurately identified by extracting other information from the application payload data.
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Figure 6-2.

Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets

Table 6-4.

False alarm rate of IDS for different feature sets

Training
Set
1
2
3
4
5

APP
0
0
0
0
0

False Positive Rate ( % )
APP + ARCH
APP + ARCH + OS
0.19
0.00051
0.08
0.00022
0.19
0.00051
0.19
0.00051
0.19
0.00051

6.2.2 Evaluation with Mixed Dataset
Apart from our crafted exploits, we also evaluate our proposed scheme using mixed data
with real-world remote DoS exploits. Remote DoS exploits involve a simpler attack scenario.
Attackers only need to initiate a one-step procedure: launch the attack against a target system
remotely. Using this set of datasets, we intend to simulate a realistic situation that both
remote DoS and sophisticated DoS exploits are mixed together. Real network traffic tend to
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be sophisticated, it will rarely contain only one type of attacks. The descriptions of real-world
remote exploits in the experiment are given in Table 5-3.
We also divide the data into five training datasets and one testing dataset. It is guaranteed
that two exploit types are absent from the training data, while the testing data contains a full
set of all exploits. A huge number of noise traffic is injected into the testing data. The
strategy is intended to evaluate the ability of the IDS to detect exploits never seen before and
avoid the false alarms. Results using mixed dataset (shown in Table 6-5) also prove the
effectiveness of integrating architectural level features. In this experiment, the total number
of normal connections is 9412 and the total number of attack instances of 472.

Table 6-5.
Training
Set
1
2
3
4
5

6.2.3

Our IDS performance for mixed datasets
# of False Alarms
APP
APP +
ARCH + OS
28
12
33
11
50
11
36
17
47
9

# of Missed Attacks
APP
APP +
ARCH + OS
2
0
2
0
3
0
2
0
2
0

Evaluation with Real-World Local Exploits

Having shown how ARCH features benefits the IDS using our developed exploits, we
test the system with two real-world local DoS exploits (Table 5-4) separately to further
demonstrate the soundness of our work. These two exploits have been used by real hackers in
the wild, to impair production servers.
We use two sets of training data: one constructed with only the hand-crafted exploits, the
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other one mixed with real-world remote DoS exploits (Table 6-6 and Table 6-7). Note that for
both sets, first five training data only contains a subset of all exploit types, and the training 6
contains a full set of all exploit types.

Table 6-6.

Dataset constructed using developed exploits

Dataset
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3
Training 4
Training 5
Training 6

Table 6-7.
Dataset
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3
Training 4
Training 5
Training 6

Combination
l2 + bsb + fsb + mem
l2 + bsb + fsb + loop
l2 + bsb + mem + loop
l2 + fsb + mem + loop
bsb + fsb + mem + loop
l2 + bsb + fsb + mem + loop

Dataset constructed using mixed exploits

Combination
l2 + bsb + fsb + mem + real_world_exploit
l2 + bsb + fsb + loop + real_world_exploit
l2 + bsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit
l2 + fsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit
bsb + fsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit
l2 + bsb + fsb + mem + loop + real_world_exploit

Figure 6-3 shows the comparison of True Positive rates using different training and
testing datasets. Table 6-8 outlines the number of false alarms of different experimental sets.
In Figure 6-3, group a’s results are based on training sets listed in Table 6-6, which are
combinations of self-developed exploits. The APP + ARCH IDS achieves an average
detection rate of 80.6% for Mem-leak-dos-1 attack, and 80.3% for Mem-leak-dos-2 attack
(five out of six datasets have 100% detection rate). Meanwhile, the APP IDS’s average
detection rates in these two cases are 19.4% and 0 separately.
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a(1)

Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-1 exploit

a(2)

Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-2 exploit

b(1)

Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-1 exploit

b(2)

Detection rate of IDS with different feature sets tested using Mem-leak-dos-2 exploit

Figure 6-3. IDS performance comparison (group a’s training data
consists
of hand-crafted exploits, group b’s training data consists of mixed-data)
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Table 6-8. IDS performance comparison (in each table, left group of
columns indicates the IDS is trained with self-developed exploits, right
group’s training data is based on mixed datasets)
a.

Training
Set

1
2
3
4
5
6

Number of false alarms for Mem-leak-dos-1

# of False Alarms
Crafted Exploits
Crafted + Real-world
Exploits
APP
APP + ARCH
APP
APP + ARCH
2
0
1
2
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

b.

Training
Set

1
2
3
4
5
6

Number of false alarms for Mem-leak-dos-2

# of False Alarms
Crafted Exploits
Crafted + Real-world
Exploits
APP
APP + ARCH
APP
APP + ARCH
1
0
1
2
1
0
4
0
2
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

The reason why the APP + ARCH IDS detects none of the mem-leak-dos-2 exploit when
trained using training set 2 is that the exploit type missing from the training set, which is
mem-dos, has the exact same architectural features as the attack. Therefore, even though the
IDS is well trained with other exploit types, it fails to detect this particular exploit efficiently.
The result of training set 6 tells that when trained with full set of all exploit types, the IDS
can accurately identify all intrusion instances.
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For group b, which is trained with mixed datasets of developed and real-world remote
exploits as listed in Table 6-7, the average TP rates for APP + ARCH IDS are 88.9% and
100% for Mem-leak-dos-1 and Mem-leak-dos-2 separately; APP IDS can only detect 30.6%
or none of those two types of attack instances. The injected real-world remote exploits in the
training data improve the detection rate of APP + ARCH IDS as compared to group a. They
remedy the degradation induced by absence of the mem-dos from the training data 2, since
they bring in similar exploit types that have the same architectural behavior as the testing
exploit. The 100% accuracy is obtained in attack detection using this set of training data. This
indicates that with more comprehensive training data, our proposed IDS can achieve more
accurate detection results.
Number of false alarms is shown in Table 6-8 by grouping the results by the testing data.
Table 6-8(a) lists the results for two sets of training data detecting mem-leak-dos-1 attack.
The APP IDS raises an average of 1.17 or 1 false alarm for two training sets, and the APP +
ARCH IDS raises 0.33 or no false alarm for those two training sets. When the volume of
network traffic grows, the difference of number of false alarms raised by the two IDSs will
increase significantly. Table 6-8(b) shows the average number of false positives for APP IDS
is 1.17 and 1 tested using mem-leak-dos-2 exploit, while the average number is 0 and 0.33 for
APP + ARCH IDS.
In conclusion, the testing results also demonstrate that ARCH features are of significant
use in identifying sophisticated DoS attacks. APP features alone can not reveal the intrusive
behaviors by monitoring at the application level. By using our crafted exploits or real-world
exploits, attackers can manage avoid detection by APP monitors, and directly induce drastic
system performance degradation, with the APP monitors still showing everything is normal.
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With addition of ARCH features, alarms will be triggered in this case because DoS attack can
not be achieved without inducing numerous ARCH level activities. Even though attackers
could escape from being caught at other levels, ARCH features will show all suspicious
activities.
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Chapter 7
Related Work
Modern DoS attacks employ many advanced and sophisticated techniques to amplify the
damage and elude detections or mitigations of countermeasures. IP spoofing is widely
adopted by hackers to mask the real source of attacks, or launch reflective DoS attacks;
Distributed DoS is used to initiate attacks from multi-source; low-rate pulsing method is
utilized to reduce average packet rate and evade network monitors. Based on a header
analysis, frequency domain characteristics are studied to improve the IDS performance [3][6],
a ramp-up behavior is also considered as a way to distinguish between single- or multi-source
attacks. In [8][10], authors propose to take a spectral analysis to detect shrew attacks which
consist of short time bursts repeating at a maliciously chosen low frequency. This kind of
low-rate attack sends out packets at certain fixed intervals, to intentionally reduce the average
packet rate, rendering the IDS unable to discover undergoing attacks. To defend against IP
spoofings, various off-line IP trace-back techniques are proposed to pinpoint the real origin of
DoS attack [17][18], some on-line countermeasures are also developed to filter out those
spoofed packets, help sustain service availability during attacks: [7] presents a Hop-Count
Filtering scheme to utilize the Time-to-Live(TTL) value in the IP header to filter out spoofed
IP packets.
Recent work on intrusion countermeasures include machine learning IDS techniques,
alert correlation, alert fusion and feature analysis. Machine learning techniques, such as
decision tree, neural network, Bayesian network, are applied to detect network intrusions.
Alert correlation attempts to correlate IDS alerts based on the similarity between alert
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attributes, previously known attack scenarios, or prerequisites and consequences of known
attacks [16]. Alert fusion combines detection outputs of the same attack from different
independent detectors. Feature Analysis tries to optimize the information gained from
multiple dimensional features through feature bagging, relevance and redundancy analysis,
and feature weight classification [11][13][14][23].
In the HIDS literature, various techniques utilizing system call tracking and auditing trails
are proposed. System call arguments are integrated to capture data-flow behaviors of
programs, and improve attack detections in HIDS [2]. A policy-driven solution is presented
in [1] to define and enforce process behavior rules controlling processes’ access to system
resources. All system behaviors are monitored in real-time by a modified kernel.
Basically, research works investigating DoS attack utilize sniffer-based methodologies.
They only rely on analyzing network traffic information at the application level. These
network-based schemes suffer from fast traffic, switched network, information encryption,
and most importantly, they have little knowledge of what is really going on in the victim
machine. Significant useful information on the victim host is neglected. HIDS against DoS
attacks are not widely researched since it is difficult to find a generic and low-cost way to
defend against such attacks. We propose to utilize the strong correlation of architectural
behaviors with DoS attacks, and employ multi-layer features to construct an IDS model.
Close to our work, Woo and Lee [22] have observed performance degradation of
multi-threaded workload under architectural DoS attacks. However, they do not further study
the correlation of architectural behavior and DoS attacks and apply into an IDS in identifying
and preventing such attacks. In our work, we are exploring architecture features to enrich the
existing feature set used for intrusion detection research and demonstrate its effectiveness in a
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systematic approach. OS level system events are also employed in our integrated IDS to
reduce the false alarms. R. Tao et al. [19] has proposed to use architectural features to
improve sophisticated DoS attack detections, which is the basis of our work. We have
extended the work and evaluated our IDS using more comprehensive datasets to further prove
the soundness of the multi-level IDS.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
We have conducted experiments to demonstrate that an IDS using only application
features failed to detect sophisticated DoS attacks because these attacks appear normal if their
behaviors are only monitored by the application feature set. In order to detect the missed
DoS attacks, we use a combination of application, OS, and architecture feature set. Both
hand-crafted exploits and real-world exploits are used to evaluate the soundness of the
multi-level IDS. Our experimental results showed improved IDS performance. In summary,
we propose the idea that if crackers use sophisticated schemes to evade defense, the
architectural level behavior monitored in conjunction with application and OS level features
provides us valuable information to improve the IDS against such DoS attacks.
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Appendix A
Buffer Overflow IDS

1. Background
Buffer overflow is one of the most prevalent methods hackers utilize to obtain security
breach. The basis for buffer overflow is that no built-it boundary check is imposed by certain
programming languages, such as C, C++. The code shown in Figure 1 is a valid program that
compiles with no error. But the adjacent buffer which is beyond the allocated space will be
overwritten.

Figure 1. Sample code of buffer overflow

Generally the hacker would utilize the programming languages’ insufficient bound
checking, store data beyond the boundaries of a fixed-size buffer. Adjacent memory locations
would be overwritten with other buffers, variables, or program flow data, resulting in
abnormal program behavior, such as memory exception, system crash, or security breach if
deliberately exploited by malicious hackers.
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2. Behavior of BoF Attacks
Previous techniques detecting BoF attacks focus on parsing and analyzing the payload
information during a connection, extract application level features, and feed the feature
events to the statistical model to build the IDS. Such schemes highly rely on characteristics
certain exploits exhibit and require comprehensive domain knowledge in feature construction.
In our work, we propose an adaptive anomaly network IDS utilizing extracted features from
the OS level together with application level features to gain higher accuracy.
Unlike DoS attack, which involves huge number of certain activities, e.g. large amount
of network requests, BoF attack generally exploits the vulnerability in a single connection by
being embedded in the payload data. Network connection information from application level
is not enough to identify and correlate attack sessions. We group network connections by
src_ip:src_port <-> dst_ip:dst_port, and the remote buffer overflow will obtain a interactive
shell session connected to a different port from which it originally launches the attack,
resulting in multiple distinct network sessions which are difficult to identify the attack and
correlate those distinct malicious connections. Analyzing the payload does not provide us
useful information to solve the problem. Each exploit will exhibit different payload
characteristic; they do not share a common pattern. Constructing features solely from the
application level is possible, but extremely low efficient, because different exploits will need
different features constructed accordingly, extensibility to cover novel attacks is not high, and
requires extra time and work. However, from OS level, some typical abnormal behaviors of
BoF attacks could be identified using BackTracker, which records every OS event.
Figure 2 illustrates an example observed using BackTracker’s system call
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Figure 2.

Observation of BoF exploit using BackTracker

Proc_28088_0
Socket 542490 0

Proc_28089_0
Socket 542505 0

Proc_28095_0
Shell

Figure 3.

Execution flow of a sample BoF exploit

tracking function. The highlighted system events exhibit abnormal behaviors that could assist
us to identify BoF exploit. As shown in Figure 3, the execution flow of this BoF exploit
consists of three steps:
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Step 1: Attacker connects to target system from network
Step 2: Malicious network connection spawn another different network session
Step 3: Obtain interactive shell session through the forked network session

3.

System Call Tracking
In our work, BackTracker’s OS level event logging and dependency tracking is utilized to

extract the OS level features of each network connections. BackTracker discovers sequences
of steps that occurred during an intrusion. Starting at a single detection point (e.g., a
suspicious file), it identifies files and processes that could have affected that detection point
and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. BackTracker is able to record every
dependency-causing event among OS objects, and span up a dependency chain starting from
one object. Complete information such as process forking, file operations, and program
execution (which is important for security analysis), is recorded in a system-call oriented
manner. That information could be utilized to provide a novel view of exploit behavior
analysis from the OS level.

4.

IDS Implementation
We integrate both the application level and OS level features. The application features

we find informative in the case of remote BoF attacks are: type, service, duration,
size_from_server, size_from_client, packet_rate, wrong_checksum_rate. And we also add
four OS features (Table 1) according to our observation from the OS level to improve the
prediction accuracy of our IDS: forked_socket_session, forked_shell, forked_from_socket,
coincided_pid.

47

Table 1.

OS level features

Fearues
Description
forked_socket_session forked
another
network
connection
forked_shell
forked shell sessions
forked_from_shell
forked from another network
connection
coincided pid
share a same pid as another
different network connection

These features in Table 1 are observable using a modified BackTracker. Modifications to
BackTracker include attaching a timestamp to every system event; exporting detailed IP
address and port number for socket sessions. With those changes, we can correlate high level
network session records with system events recorded by BackTracker’s system call tracking
function embedded in Linux kernel.

5.

IDS Performance
Exploits we used to train and test our BoF IDS are all from real-world. We successfully

utilized those tools to exploit targeted software vulnerabilities, and obtained interactive shell
sessions. Table 2 gives detailed information of BoF exploits we employed.
The 60 exploit instances are divided into five training datasets, with one type of exploits
absent from each training set. And the testing data include all types of BoF exploits. Testing
result shown in Figure 4 demonstrates that OS level events help improve the accuracy of True
Positive rate. An average True Negative rate of 99.6% is also considered as a good
performance.
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Table 2.
CVE Number
CVE-2002-0177

CVE-2003-0201

CVE-2004-0396

NA

Description of BoF exploits

Name
Description
Icecast AVLLib Buffer Remote user may send arbitrary
Overflow Vulnerability long string to the server, leading
to a stack overflow and execution
of user supplied code. Execution
privilege of the Icecast server will
be obtained.
Samba
Anonymous user may corrupt
'call_trans2open'
sensitive locations in memory
Remote
Buffer and execute arbitrary commands
Overflow Vulnerability by
passing
excessive
user-supplied data into a static
buffer.
CVS Malformed Entry A remote heap overflow could
when
handling
Modified
and occur
Unchanged
Flag user-supplied input for entry lines
Insertion
Heap with 'modified' and 'unchanged'
Overflow Vulnerability flags, possibly leading to
arbitrary code execution.
Dr.Cat Drcatd Multiple Unauthorized
access
and/or
Buffer
Overflow elevated
privilege
on
the
Vulnerabilities
vulnerable system may be
achieved by exploiting the
vulnerability
of
insufficient
boundary checks of some
functions of this application.

APP

APP + OS

100%
90%

True Positive

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
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0%
1

2
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4

Training Set

Figure 4.

True Positive rate comparison
49

5

Appendix B
Control Register Layout for Pentium D
ESCR MSR:
The layout of ESCR MSR is illustrated in Figure 1.

63

30
Reserved

24
Event Select

8
Event Mask

Figure 1.

5

4

3

Tag

Tag

O

Value

Enable

S

2 1 0
USR

ESCR layout

Bit 0-1: Reserved
Bit 2: USR flag – set counter to count events when processor operates in user mode
Bit 3: OS flag – set counter to count events when processor operates in privileged
level.
Bit 4: Tag enable – enable tagging of μops.
Bit 5-8: Tag value field – select a tag value to associate with a μop.
Bit 9-24: Event mask field – select events to count from event class selected
Bit 25-30: Event select field – select a class of events to count.

CCCR MSR:
CCCR MSR controls the filtering and counting of events, together with interrupt
generation. The layout of CCCR MSR is illustrated in Figure 2.
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63

31 30 29
Reserved

O

26

Reserved

25 24 23

19 18 17

Threshold

15

13
ESCR Select

Figure 2.

12 11
E

Reserved

CCCR layout

Bit 0-11: Reserved.
Bit 12: Enable flag – enable events counting
Bit 13-15: ESCR select – select the ESCR to be used to select the events to be
counted.
Bit 16-17: Reserved – must be set to 11B.
Bit 18: Compare flag – enable filtering of the event counting.
Bit 19: Complement flag – configure how the event count is compared with the
threshold value.
Bit 20-23: Threshold value – set the threshold value to be compared with.
Bit 24: Edge flag – enable rising edge detection of filtering event counts.
Bit 25: FORCE_OVF flag – force a counter overflow on every counter increment.
Bit 26: OVF_PMI flag – enable a performance monitor interrupt (PMI) to be
generated when the counter overflow occurs.
Bit 30: Cascade flag – enable one counter in a pair to start counting when the other
counter overflows.
Bit 31: OVF flag – indicate that the counter has overflowed when set
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